Construcciones sociales sobre corrupción de los servidores públicos de la rama ejecutiva, en Bogotá
| dc.contributor.advisor | Zapata, Sebastián | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Cala Vitery, Favio | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Acuña Gómez, Johana Sareth | |
| dc.creator | Peralta Borray, Diego Alejandro | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-04-20T21:28:39Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2024-11-17 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Siguiendo las acepciones clásicas, la “corrupción pública” puede definirse como un comportamiento en el que el funcionario o servidor público abusa del poder que ostenta o se le ha encomendado en beneficio de sí mismo y que puede observarse en conductas como la apropiación indebida, el clientelismo, las irregularidades en la contratación pública y el soborno, entre otras. Para que una conducta corrupta se materialice dentro de una entidad gubernamental es necesario que confluyan, por un lado, la intención y capacidad para llevarla a cabo, y por el otro, que la organización no se resista o peor aún, que aliente la conducta irregular. Este trabajo profundiza en el estudio del problema de la Tolerancia a la Corrupción por parte de los servidores públicos, entendida como la preferencia de un individuo inocente por guardar silencio al ser testigo de un comportamiento o actuación corrupta, en lugar de denunciarla. El análisis considera que los servidores públicos, al adquirir el conocimiento concreto sobre sus roles, y exponerse a la cultura de la organización se ven inmersos en un proceso de socialización a partir del cual, aprenden y configuran para sí, una construcción propia del mundo y se explicita en sus acciones o inacciones. Por lo que se crea una red de reglas tacitas que enmarcan los comportamientos aceptables dentro del grupo social. Para lograr la comprensión de la Tolerancia a la Corrupción, se usó una metodología mixta en la que, en la primera etapa se construyó una Teoría Fundamentada, lo que implicó la codificación abierta, axial y selectiva de entrevistas en profundidad realizadas a 27 servidores públicos vinculados a entidades gubernamentales en la ciudad de Bogotá. Como resultado se obtuvo una visión de proceso de la tolerancia a la corrupción en la que emergieron como categoría central las emociones (Ira, Miedo, Apatía) y su implicación en el proceso de racionalización que lleva a la denuncia. También se abordó la importancia de la auto percepción de vulnerabilidad de los servidores públicos y sus posibles determinantes. La segunda etapa de la investigación requirió que las categorías y relaciones teóricas encontradas inicialmente se transformaran en variables que permitieran elaborar un modelo exploratorio, para este propósito, se elaboró un instrumento de encuesta en escala Likert que recopilo información sobre 20 variables en 78 preguntas y fue aplicado a 48 servidores públicos de una población total de 160 servidores en una misma organización. Como resultado se obtuvieron dos modelos, uno basado en regresiones lineales múltiples y otro confirmatorio a partir de regresiones logísticas binomiales. Entre los hallazgos más importantes se identificó que el cumplimiento estricto de los procedimientos por parte de los servidores públicos se usa como una racionalización para diluir la responsabilidad y mitigar la disonancia cognitiva y la culpa que puede generar ser testigo de actos de corrupción y no denunciarlo. | |
| dc.description.abstractenglish | Following classical definitions, “public corruption” may be understood as behavior in which a civil servant abuses the power they hold or have been entrusted with for personal gain. This phenomenon may manifest in practices such as embezzlement, clientelism, irregularities in public procurement, and bribery, among others. For corrupt behavior to materialize within a governmental entity, it is necessary that two conditions converge: on the one hand, the intention and capacity to carry it out, and on the other, the absence of organizational resistance—or, even more concerning, the active encouragement of such irregular conduct. This study examines in depth the problem of Tolerance of Corruption among public servants, understood as the preference of an otherwise non-involved individual to remain silent when witnessing corrupt behavior, rather than reporting it. The analysis assumes that public servants, as they acquire concrete knowledge about their roles and become exposed to organizational culture, are immersed in a process of socialization through which they learn and construct their own understanding of reality, which is subsequently reflected in their actions or inactions. As a result, a network of tacit rules emerges, framing what is considered acceptable behavior within the social group. To achieve a comprehensive understanding of Tolerance of Corruption, a mixed-methods approach was employed. In the first stage, a Grounded Theory was developed, involving open, axial, and selective coding of in-depth interviews conducted with 27 public servants affiliated with governmental entities in the city of Bogotá. This stage yielded a process-oriented perspective on tolerance of corruption, in which emotions—specifically anger, fear, and apathy—emerged as the core category, along with their role in the rationalization process that leads to reporting behavior. The analysis also addressed the importance of public servants’ self-perception of vulnerability and its potential determinants. In the second stage, the initially identified categories and theoretical relationships were operationalized into variables to construct an exploratory model. For this purpose, a Likert-scale survey instrument was designed to collect data on 20 variables across 78 items and was administered to 48 public servants from a total population of 160 within the same organization. As a result, two models were developed: one based on multiple linear regressions and another confirmatory model using binomial logistic regressions. Among the most significant findings, it was identified that strict compliance with procedures by public servants is used as a form of rationalization to diffuse responsibility and mitigate the cognitive dissonance and guilt that may arise from witnessing acts of corruption without whistleblowing them. | |
| dc.format.extent | 57 páginas | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/39465 | |
| dc.language.iso | es | |
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| dc.subject | Tolerancia a la corrupción | |
| dc.subject | Corrupción organizacional | |
| dc.subject | Comportamiento ético | |
| dc.subject | Decisiones éticas | |
| dc.subject | Cultura organizacional | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Tolerance of corruption | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Organizational corruption | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Ethical behavior | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Ethical decision-making | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Organizational culture. | |
| dc.subject.lemb | Corrupción administrativa - Aspectos sociales | |
| dc.subject.lemb | Servidores públicos - Conducta ética | |
| dc.subject.lemb | Cultura organizacional - Influencia en la conducta | |
| dc.title | Construcciones sociales sobre corrupción de los servidores públicos de la rama ejecutiva, en Bogotá | |
| dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06 |
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