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dc.coverage.spatialhttp://expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co
dc.creatorNiño Ochoa, Edinson Douglas
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-26T15:26:31Z
dc.date.available2020-08-26T15:26:31Z
dc.date.created2009
dc.identifier.otherhttps://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/29577305/Nino__2009._Peircean_Pragmatism_and_Inference_toi_the_Best_Explanation_%28first_draft%29.pdf?1350827728=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DPeircean_Pragmatism_and_Inference_to_the.pdf&Expires=1598457743&Signature=Onx7QGaKXBaDmI-bPOzniduFt5BvEhEXTjw9UMu4f2vo7cJl~gJIHbPIAzUnj118~6zW8VwyiizQTJKbU751AJFLueovQFvoe8nrsm6jFM3pLhwf0mT2UvxoLuf93QNJlKZWE53iKM7E8XvIOvv-YTdmyrOmpDdDVaLFkRqZSVwjHd3vRlJyi77ebpCR0oJOD-PKFdC8rcdVFdPbsQIdebuUjYdiHa43leLBsAF6dK5CsZ6PlNw39ojtQ7rNIvJk-T4-JumOJpxIdkIyaF40xIjFZ-It8bwOFgqYCNATmA4Mgz-8MLfbYrSQqpRgrfsc44hK7ZUP50GIGNeHToltew__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZAspa
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/12308
dc.format.extent15 páginasspa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.subjectInductionspa
dc.subjectPragmatismspa
dc.titlePeircean pragmatism and inference to the best explanationspa
dc.type.localCapítulo de librospa
dc.subject.lembInference to the best explanationspa
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
dc.type.hasversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.rights.localAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.subject.keywordAbductionspa
dc.subject.keywordPragmatismspa
dc.identifier.repourlhttp://expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co
dc.description.hashtag#PragmatismAndInferencespa
dc.description.hashtag#BestExplanationspa
dc.identifier.CvLAChttp://scienti.colciencias.gov.co:8081/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000250422spa
dc.description.abstractenglishIn the current literature about Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) it is usual to treat it both as a synonym of ‘Abduction’ (or at least, intimately related with peircean Abduction) and as encompassing non-deductive inference. However, Peirce not only distinguished between abduction, induction, and deduction, he did it in the framework of a very peculiar idea of experience, in which ‘experience’ is understood as future-action-oriented, rather than past-cumulative-data, more proper of the empiricist tradition. As a consequence, these two philosophical attitudes have a very different understanding on the role of evidence in the inferences. The purpose of this presentation is twofold. On one hand, to propose three criteria to distinguish between Peircean Abduction and Induction and to explain the role that Peirce’s ideas of experience and evidence have in them. On the other hand, to contrast these criteria and philosophical framework with those proposed by contemporary IBE’s theorists.spa
dc.type.driverhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/CAP_LIB
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2f33spa


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