Peircean pragmatism and inference to the best explanation
Niño Ochoa, Edinson Douglas
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Resumo em língua estrangeira
In the current literature about Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) it is usual to treat it both as a synonym of ‘Abduction’ (or at least, intimately related with peircean Abduction) and as encompassing non-deductive inference. However, Peirce not only distinguished between abduction, induction, and deduction, he did it in the framework of a very peculiar idea of experience, in which ‘experience’ is understood as future-action-oriented, rather than past-cumulative-data, more proper of the empiricist tradition. As a consequence, these two philosophical attitudes have a very different understanding on the role of evidence in the inferences. The purpose of this presentation is twofold. On one hand, to propose three criteria to distinguish between Peircean Abduction and Induction and to explain the role that Peirce’s ideas of experience and evidence have in them. On the other hand, to contrast these criteria and philosophical framework with those proposed by contemporary IBE’s theorists.
Link para o recursohttps://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/29577305/Nino__2009._Peircean_Pragmatism_and_Inference_toi_the_Best_Explanation_%28first_draft%29.pdf?1350827728=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DPeircean_Pragmatism_and_Inference_to_the.pdf&Expires=1598457743&Signature=Onx7QGaKXBaDmI-bPOzniduFt5BvEhEXTjw9UMu4f2vo7cJl~gJIHbPIAzUnj118~6zW8VwyiizQTJKbU751AJFLueovQFvoe8nrsm6jFM3pLhwf0mT2UvxoLuf93QNJlKZWE53iKM7E8XvIOvv-YTdmyrOmpDdDVaLFkRqZSVwjHd3vRlJyi77ebpCR0oJOD-PKFdC8rcdVFdPbsQIdebuUjYdiHa43leLBsAF6dK5CsZ6PlNw39ojtQ7rNIvJk-T4-JumOJpxIdkIyaF40xIjFZ-It8bwOFgqYCNATmA4Mgz-8MLfbYrSQqpRgrfsc44hK7ZUP50GIGNeHToltew__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA
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